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I. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
 
This scenario may sound all too familiar to many.  An estimate for 
an unexpected car (or it could be boat, furnace, etc.) repair comes in well 
above budget and so a second, or even third, estimate is sought.  Alas 
those estimates are not fundamentally different.  The shop hourly charge 
may vary but the estimated time for the repair is identical.  That outcome 
is hardly a coincidence though as all the shops contacted were using the 
same repair time estimation manual, known variously as flat rate or labor 
time guide manuals.  Those manuals – examples used here apply 
exclusively to automobile mechanical repairs although the process 
operates similarly for other mechanical and collision repairs – provide an 
estimated repair time for a specific repair on a specified vehicle, say an 
alternator replacement for a 2012 Toyota Celica with air conditioner.  
The customer is then charged for those hours (at the shop hourly rate) 
whether the actual service takes fewer or more hours.  Many shops also 
pay their technicians based on the same number of estimated hours, 
known as ‘flag hours,’ again whether the actual time spent is more or less 
than the manual estimate.1   
Each automobile manufacturer produces its own flat rate manual for 
warranty repairs, which may be modified for dealer non-warranty work, 
while independent repair shops typically purchase manuals (or online 
services) from one of several providers:  
 
• Chilton Labor Time Guide Manuals2 
• Motor Labor Guide Manuals3 
• ALLDATA – subscription service (part of Motor) 
• Mitchell PRODEMAND Estimator4 
 
Market share data for the private firms are not available but the 
limited number of firms (3) indicates the sector is quite concentrated.  
Entry is limited by the multiproduct offering of the companies to the 
                                                 
1 See Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 18 (2013) at 20-21 
(considering if under California’s minimum wage law mechanics paid on a 
‘piece-rate’ basis were eligible for the minimum wage during idle hours when 
there were no vehicles requiring servicing). 
2 See Chilton’s Labor Guides, AUTOREPAIRMANUALS.biz, 
https://perma.cc/XB6T-DGWE. 
3 MOTOR LABOR GUIDE MANUAL, https://perma.cc/RY7F-Q5QW. 
4 ProDemand: Repair Information To Get the Job Done Right, MITCHELL1, 
https://perma.cc/GC5V-B6HB (last visited March 18, 2016). 
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same customers,5 entry into a multiproduct market being more difficult 
than for single products.  Further limiting entry is the economics of a 
product with high fixed costs (assembling the manual) and low variable 
(distribution) costs meaning entrants have lower net returns than do 
established ones. 
Auto manufacturers reportedly use careful time studies for their time 
estimates6 although in at least one instance the dealers were permitted, 
and did in hundreds of instances, to suggest changes in the time estimates 
in the manual.7  The source of the non-warranty estimates and those used 
by the independent publishers are less clear, but there are suggestions the 
manufacturer times are merely added to “liberally.” “Some additional 
labor time is justified.  As cars get older, it often takes longer to remove 
rusted bolts, clear accumulated road dirt, and the like.  But the 
independent flat-rate manuals still often overestimate the time needed for 
repairs.”8  By one estimate the warranty manual time estimates are raised 
by 1.5 times9 so that “[M]ost mechanics can beat the flat-rate allowance 
most of the time.”10  One retired General Motors vice president is quoted 
as saying, “Show me one flat rate time allowance that most technicians 
will not beat by 10 to 20 percent and I will be surprised.”11   
Any repair, whether using estimates or observed times, will lead to a 
range of hours depending on the skill and experience of individual 
technicians.  The manual time is intended to represent the average repair 
time, the time required by a technician of average skill. Some technicians 
will complete the tasks more rapidly, some less so.  For a shop the 
concept is the posted flag time represents on average the time actually 
required, a matter of averages.  For experienced piece-work technicians 
who can complete a job in less than the flag time the effect is earnings 
above his/her hourly rate.  Slower technicians will earn commensurably 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., services offered by Motor, https://perma.cc/PW2N-CJCP. 
6 Joseph Holschuh, How to Utilize Flat-Rate Billing in Your Service 
Department, Farm Equipment (July 20, 2009), https://perma.cc/QWA4-CY8W. 
7 Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., 601 F.2d 139, 142-43 (4th Cir. 1979) (which 
reversed a summary judgment for dismissal of a suit for price fixing under 15 
U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). 
8 Arthur P. Glickman et al., AVOIDING AUTO REPAIRS RIP-OFFS 11 (Consumers 
Union of United States 1995). 
9 JIMROAL, The Truth About The Auto Repair Industry, https://perma.cc/4LHL-
LEP9. 
10 Glickman, supra note 8, at 14. 
11 Id. (quoting W.G. Buxton). 
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less.  “It is not impossible, or even that uncommon, for a mechanic to 
flag over 16 hours in an 8 hour day.”12 
In a 1978 study by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration of consumer losses from auto repairs, inflated manual 
repair time estimates were identified as a possible source but sufficient 
information was lacking to calculate the amount of overcharge, if any.13  
However in 1980 the N.Y. Attorney General’s Office estimated N.Y. 
State motorists were being overcharged $73 million annually ($207 
million in current dollars) through the use of flat rate manuals.14 
Manual publishers state the advantage of their use as providing the 
customer with a fixed cost estimate under which the shop takes the risk 
the repair can indeed be completed in the projected time.  This in contrast 
to the use of ‘time and material’ pricing under which the consumer is 
unaware of the final cost until completion and so takes all the risk of a 
slower-than-anticipated repair, including when work is done by a less 
experienced technician.  Shops benefit from manual use through 
enhanced management and the opportunity to reward experienced 
technicians – those who can beat the flag hours – and hence retain them 
better.15 
While there are evident business reasons for repair shops to use 
flat rate manuals, they can also be utilized to coordinate and raise repair 
charges across a wide range of repair providers in a market.  Here, I 
develop a damage model in Section II to specify that the independent 
manual publishers have an economic incentive to raise the cost of repairs 
across a range of sectors by inflating the flag hours for repairs, and 
thereby increase the demand for their manuals.  In order to communicate 
the benefits of this approach to their repair shop customers they by 
necessity must publicize their approach using public media, including 
magazine articles, advertisements, and trade seminars.  As a result, I 
argue in Section III they are not liable for price fixing, which under 
                                                 
12 JIMROAL, supra note 9. 
13 NAT’L. HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T. TRANSP., DOT HS-
803 355, AUTO REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE: PROGRAM TO REDUCE CONSUMER 
LOSS (1978). 
14 Glickman, supra note 8. 
15 Air Solutions Heating and Air Conditioning, Air Solutions Flat Rate Pricing 
Manual for Technicians” Undated. 
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Sherman Section 116 requires active collusion, but are liable under 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.17   
I further argue that the typical ‘cease and desist’ consent decree 
remedy for a Section 5 violation is inadequate in the case of flat rate 
manuals because their use is so ubiquitous that it will continue for an 
extended period even in the absence of ongoing promotion by the 
publishers.  Rather what is required is a disclosure of the methods by 
which the flat rate times are established so that it is possible for a 
knowledgeable party to determine if the rates reflect actual time 
requirements or are indeed inflated, as I argue they are likely to be.  
Should the values be found to be inflated then a consent agreement must 
include an order to adopt a non-inflationary estimation methodology. 
 
II.  DAMAGE MODEL 
 
To begin it is helpful to recognize a flat rate manual as a particular 
form of database.  With databases the cost is in the compilation of the 
figures, not in their reproduction and distribution.  That is, fixed costs 
can be high but variable ones are typically low, particularly when 
distribution is done through the Internet.  An obvious profit-enhancing 
strategy then is to increase sales/use, which distributes the fixed costs 
over a broader number of units, reducing average costs and raising 
profits for all sales.   
Manual purchasers will buy manuals if the manuals increase repair 
shop profits, which can be accomplished by lowering costs or raising 
receipts, or both.  Simplifying management and enhancing the 
satisfaction of customers both lowers costs and raises sales.  These are 
legitimate uses of the manuals.  Profits can also be raised by increasing 
prices for individual repairs by charging customers for more hours than 
the repairs actually take by overstating the flat rate hours requirement.  
That is equivalent to raising the effective per hour shop charge above the 
posted level, which can be considered illegitimate, particularly if 
customers reasonably assume the repair time estimates represent actual 
requirements.   
Shops which utilize flat rate manuals with overstated hour repair 
requirements will then experience a profit increase, which will both help 
assure repeat manual purchases and the extension of sales to other non-
adopting shops once the benefits of manual use are appreciated.  Manual 
                                                 
16 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). 
17 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (LEXIS through 
2015). 
5
Lesser: Are Flat Rate Repair Time Manual Publishers Inviting Collusion?
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
430 Journal of Business & Securities Law [Vol. 16 
 
producers to expand sales must convey information on the benefit of 
manual use to would-be purchasers, which I argue here is done in a way 
which violates section 5 of the FTC Act.  However, the approach of 
overstating hours will not be effective if (a) consumers shift business to 
lower priced non-manual using shops, or (b) if the higher prices cause a 
sharp decline in the overall demand for repairs.  Let us consider the 
reduced demand possibility first.  Because the demand curve for products 
and services is downward sloping, the ‘Law of Demand’ says that higher 
prices lead to reduced demand.  That is for all practical purposed 
universal.  What changes is the degree of the effect.  If quantity demand 
declines less than proportionally to the price increase, total revenue 
(price x quantity) increases, and vice versa.  The degree of the effect can 
be measured by the elasticity of demand;18 if it is less than one (in 
absolute value as the numbers are negative due to the negative slope of 
the demand curve) then demand is inelastic meaning revenues rise with 
price increases, and again vice versa.   
Estimated demand elasticities for auto repairs are notably inelastic, 
in the -.36 to -.40 range19 meaning higher prices will increase overall 
repair shop sector revenues.  These estimates make intuitive sense 
because there are few options (substitutes) to a repair, buying a different 
car or driving it broken, both of which have clear limits, all the more at 
the current level of technical sophistication where cars are way too 
complex for home repair.  Moreover, if the car is inoperable or fails 
inspection the repair becomes critical for many owners, reducing the 
opportunity for consumers to comparison shop.  And of course shop 
owners do not need to be aware of the formal concept of demand 
elasticities; they need merely to observe closely the response of their 
customers to price increases.   
But some shifting to lower priced repair shops, including in my 
scenario to those shops not using flat rate manuals, is possible over time. 
Under that scenario higher price manual-using shops will lose customers, 
and profits.  That possibility though is more of an impetus for low-priced 
shops to raise prices (including by adopting the use of flat rate manuals) 
                                                 
18 The formula is dQ/dPxP/Q where Q is quantity demanded and P price.  See 
any introductory microeconomics text or online explanation, e.g., “Demand and 
Elasticity” available at 
http://cobe.boisestate.edu/econ/lreynol/web/micro202/Chapter_9_elasticity.pdf.  
19 ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR, 125 (Christina 
Kouvelis et al. eds., 9th ed. 2015). Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press reported in 
R.H. Frank, Microeconomics and Behavior, McGraw-Hill, 9th Ed., 2014, Table 
4.5. 
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than for higher priced ones to lower theirs.  The low demand elasticities 
noted above indicate more is to be gained by individual shops by raising 
prices than by lowering them.  Manual producers then need to convey the 
message that if all shops use their manuals, thereby raising prices 
universally, all repair shops will benefit.  This is of course the classic 
case of price fixing, except here there is no explicit agreement among the 
shops. 
In essence my damage model is based around the well-established 
theoretical premise that completion works most effectively when 
consumers are well informed about product attributes like quality and 
can effectively shop for better prices.20  Few consumers are 
knowledgeable about the required repairs to restore a broken car to safe 
operating condition, while the widespread use of flat rate manuals limits 
the range of competing repair prices, reducing the incentive to search for 
lower estimates.  Those conditions present a strong opportunity to 
overstate repair times to the benefit of repair shops and indirectly flat rate 
manual sellers.   
It has been argued in court that it would be against the economic 
interest of automobile manufactures for their part to raise repair costs as 
that would discourage repeat car sales.21  That interpretation however 
overlooks two attributes of the automobile market.  One is that sales 
seem affected only to a limited degree by repair costs, as any reading of 
Consumer Reports repair frequency reports will verify.22  Second, auto 
dealerships make most of their income from repairs and parts, not new 
car sales. According to a Forbes article, “Financial results for the six 
publicly traded, new-car dealer groups in the United States show that to a 
great extent, dealerships are in the business of selling new and used cars 
                                                 
20 One of the six requirements for the existence of perfect competition is the 
presence of perfect knowledge about product prices and attributes at zero cost.  
See, e.g., Geoff Riley, Perfect Competition - Economics of Competitive Markets, 
TUTOR2U, available at https://perma.cc/4CKP-UJUX. 
21 Link v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 923 (3d Cir. 
1986) (“Experts testified that because of Mercedes’ interest in encouraging 
repeat customers, it would be against its [Mercedes-Benz’s] economic interest to 
raise or fix repair prices.”). 
22 Buying Guide 2014, Vol. 78, No. 13, CONSUMER REPORTS, Oct. 2013, at 145-
56 (which reports by year, make and model repair frequencies for 17 major 
components and used to value the reliability as a used car and, by extension, a 
prediction of reliability as a new car for the current model year.  Some 
makes/models are rated “Much Worse Than Average” for years and even 
decades, suggesting minimizing repair costs is a low priority for many 
purchasers). 
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so they can service them and finance them.”  “The gross margin for 
service and parts was 57 percent for the Penske group [a publicly traded 
new car dealership system], vs. just 8 percent for new-vehicle sales.”23  It 
is likely that if service was not as profitable for auto dealerships they 
would demand greater margins on new car sales, meaning high service 
fees can increase not decrease the profit of manufacturers. 
Now that it has been discussed how inflated flat rate hours when 
universally applied benefit shop owners as well as manual producers, it is 
necessary to describe how those benefits are conveyed by manual 
producers in potentially illegal ways.  Here are quotes from trade 
advertisements: 
 
“The ‘Choice’ system can help change this picture by charging the right 
price to the customers (instead of giving it away)…”24 
 
“The more effective a service department is at flat-rate billing, the more 
profitable it will be for the dealership and the techs, and the happier the 
customers will be.”25 
 
[E]ven the smallest steps toward flat-rating can yield a 5-10% 
improvement in efficiency.26 
 
“[F]lat-rating works by beating the averages.”27 
 
“The standards are designed to be utilized by Nissan dealers in work 
process control for improved service shop productivity and efficiency.”28 
From this economic overview it can be concluded that flat rate 
manual producers and users have an incentive to inflate the estimated 
repair time hours, and that the manual producers in their marketing 
pitches strongly hint that repair time estimates are indeed overstated.  
Costs are born by repair shop customers, those needing auto repairs.   
Lacking from this model is an explanation of how this system 
purportedly functions, as it has both vertical and horizontal behavioral 
components.  Vertically, manual producers in their self-interest to sell 
                                                 
23 Jim Henry, The Surprising Ways Car Dealers Make The Most Money Off You, 
FORBES (Feb. 20, 2012), available at https://perma.cc/R9XD-GPK3. 
24 Air Solutions supra note 15 (emphasis in original). 
25 Holschuh, supra note 6. 
26 Id.  
27 Id. 
28 Morrison, supra note 7, at 144. 
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more manuals signal to their customers, repair shop operators, the 
benefits of using a flat rate manual, benefits which include overestimates 
of repair time requirements.  Due to the number and dispersion of repair 
shops, the signaling by manual producers must be done through public 
advertising.  Shop operators will perceive that the benefits of inflated-
time-estimates flat rate manual use will be more advantageous the more 
they are employed by competitor shops.  Hence, shop operators will 
tacitly conspire to raise prices by condoning the use of flat rate manuals, 
resulting in an approximation of retail price maintenance.  Consumers 
will be unfairly treated regarding repair costs as they will reasonably 
believe the repair time estimates are valid representations of actual time 
requirements, leading them to curtail a search for a lower overall cost 
estimate. 
What needs to be explored next is if such alleged actions are 
potentially illegal under the several antitrust laws.  In part it must be 
determined if it is possible to be in violation when the alleged conspiracy 
is induced indirectly through private or public communication but never 
explicitly accepted/agreed to. We begin by examining the Sherman Act, 
sidestep briefly to consider contributory infringement under the patent 
statutes, and finish with an evaluation of section 5 of the FTC Act. 
 
III. TREATMENT OF INDUCEMENT UNDER THE ANTITRUST AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS 
 
A. Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
 
The Sherman Act section 1 prohibits "[e]very contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared 
to be illegal."29  Over time the courts have determined that horizontal 
agreements among competitors that fix prices are per se illegal.30  What 
constitutes a ‘price’ the courts have decided extends well beyond the 
literal meaning to encompass other restraints such as uniform inputs, 
which would include the fixed labor input time component prescribed by 
flat rate manuals.31  However the courts have determined that section 1 
violations require some showing of ‘concerted action’ among the 
                                                 
29 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). 
30 See United States v. Trenton Potters Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
31 Nat’l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 422 (7th Cir. 1965) (“'Fix 
or establish the kinds or proportions of ingredients to be used ….’”). 
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conspirators.32  That action can be “accomplished by express contract or 
by some more subtle means”.33  Vertical price fixing often in the form of 
retail price maintenance is also legally actionable.  However, since State 
Oil Co. v. Khan34 and Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, 
Inc.35 the Supreme Court has held that vertical price fixing cases are to 
be given rule-of-reason treatment. 
An effective rebuttal in such cases is to identify a legitimate business 
reason for the observed conduct.  In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service 
Corp. the Supreme Court declared there are legitimate business reasons a 
manufacturer and its distributors might wish to exchange information so 
that the mere evidence of an information exchange is insufficient to 
establish a conspiracy.  “A manufacturer and its distributors have 
legitimate reasons to exchange information about the price and reception 
of [their] products in the market”.36 
The courts identified the market structures of the relevant markets to 
indicate susceptibility to the exercise of market power.  The most 
susceptible were determined to be those which were highly concentrated, 
dealt in fungible products, and were subject to inelastic demand – the so 
called ‘plus factors’.37  The flat rate manual business as has been 
discussed is highly concentrated and their products are generally 
interchangeable.  For their part, repair shops are faced with inelastic 
demand, so at least the conditions for tacit collusion apply to the flat rate 
manual business. 
No ‘concerted action’ is suggested among the flat rate manual 
producers, among the repair facilities nor between the facilities and 
manual producers so that Sherman section 1 does not apply to the issue 
under examination here.  Indeed, the courts made that interpretation clear 
as applied to the production and use of the manuals in Jules Link and 
                                                 
32 Fragale & Sons Beverage Co. v. Dill, 760 F.2d 469, 473 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(“Because of this concerted action requirement, unilateral or independent 
activity, no matter what its motivation, does not violate section 1.”). 
33 Nat’l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n supra note 31, at 427 (“Price fixing is contrary to 
the policy of competition underlying the Sherman Act…  It makes no difference 
whether [] the price fixing is accomplished by express contract or by some more 
subtle means; …”). 
34 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (“[V]ertical maximum price 
fixing, like the majority of commercial arrangements subject to the antitrust 
laws, should be evaluated under the rule of reason.”) 
35 Leegin Creative Leather Prods. Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) 
(“Vertical price restraints are to be judged according to the rule of reason.”). 
36 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984). 
37 Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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Solomon Katz v. Daimler-Benz of North America Holding Co., Inc.  Link 
and Katz are representatives of a class of purchasers of non-warranty 
repairs from the defendant Mercedes dealership who charged the parent 
firm “conspired with their authorized dealers ‘to fix, raise and maintain 
rates charged for non-warranty auto repairs performed on Mercedes-
Benz automobiles by … basing the rates on the parties’ prices and labor 
times set forth’ in a manual known as the MBNA [Mercedes Benz of 
North America] Labor Time Guide.”38   
The plaintiffs submitted evidence that the dealers sent employees to 
seminars at which Mercedes taught and distributed the service 
management control system and time guides; evidence of agreements “to 
which dealers agreed to accept Mercedes’ recommendations concerning 
use of time guides and service management control systems.”39  The 
appeals court however found that while the plaintiffs “demonstrate[ed] 
an opportunity for conspiracy” … they could not “‘exclude the 
possibility’ that Mercedes’ dealers ‘were acting independently’” and 
hence not in violation of section 1.40 
Even if the other dimensions of the case had applied, Illinois Brick 
would have made it impossible for the plaintiffs to recover damages from 
Mercedes Benz.  That case prohibits indirect purchasers of a good or 
service from recovering antitrust damages.41 
 
B. Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
 
Section 2 makes an offense of "[e]very person who shall monopolize, 
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person 
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony 
. . ."42  In U.S. v. Grinnell Corp. the Supreme Court identified that a 
violation of section 2 required (1) the possession of market power in the 
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power.43  While the manual producers may in their highly concentrated 
market potentially have market power there is no indication they applied 
that power horizontally to enhance their position.  Rather the premise 
                                                 
38 Link v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 920 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
39 Id. at 922. 
40 Id. at 923-24. 
41 Ill Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735-41 (1977). 
42 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004). 
43 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
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here is vertical inducement to inflate repair costs meaning section 2 is not 
at issue. 
That said, one section 2 case does provide some indication of the 
Court’s interpretation of inducement, in that instance through a private 
communication.  The case involved American and Braniff Airlines and 
their operations at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport.  The two 
lines had a joint 76 percent market share, and a 60-90 percent share 
between 15 major cities.44  
In February 1982 Crandal, American’s CEO, called Putnam, 
Braniff’s, complaining about the price competition between the two 
lines:  
 
Putnam: “Do you have a suggestion for me?” 
Crandal: “Yes, I have a suggestion for you.  Raise your goddam fares 
twenty percent.  I’ll raise mine the next morning.” 
 
Rather than raising Braniff’s fares though Putnam sent the 
government a tape of the conversation.  The question before the appeals 
court then was whether an attempted monopolization could occur in the 
absence of an actual agreement. 
The court cited Swift.45 In Swift, the court stated that, "when that 
intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this statute, like 
many others, and like the common law in some cases, directs itself 
against that dangerous probability as well as against the completed 
result."46  The subsequent issue was then whether American’s Crandall 
had actually attempted to monopolize or merely solicited an agreement.  
Here the court cited United States v. May47 and United States v. Robles48, 
both of which involved a solicitation, the former by telephone, the latter 
by mail.  In both cases the courts concluded the contacts initiated a 
course of conduct intended to violate the law.  In American Airlines the 
appeals court decided “solicitation accompanied by the requisite intent 
may constitute an attempt”49 as it was found to in this instance.  That is, 
an attempt can exist absent an agreement.   
The Court determined that, “the government need not allege or prove 
an agreement to monopolize in order to establish an attempted joint 
                                                 
44 United States v. American Airlines, 743 F.2d 1114, 1115-16 (1984). 
45 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1904). 
46 American Airlines supra note 44, at 1118. 
47 625 F.2d 186, 194 (8th Cir. 1980). 
48 185 F. Supp. 82, 85 (N.D. Cal. 1960). 
49 American Airlines supra note 44, at 1121. 
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monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act.”50  Previously the 
appeals court had noted "only the section 1 Sherman Act and the Wilson 
Tariff Act charges require proof of a combination or conspiracy".51 
Hence the courts have recognized that a conspiracy is possible even if 
merely solicited and absent evidence of acceptance.  That matter is 
relevant to the flat rate inducement case as is discussed below. 
Recognizing the preceding cases applied to horizontal agreements, 
those among competitors, another relevant dimension was made clear in 
United States v Yellow Cab Company.  In it, Mr. Justice Murphy 
recognized the scope of antitrust law extended to vertical arrangements 
as well.  “The fact that a manufacturer and users of its products of whom 
the manufacturer has acquired control may be regarded as a vertically 
integrated enterprise does not prevent a restraint of such users from 
dealing with other manufacturers from constituting a violation of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.”52  The decision did not apply to a trial of the 
merits of that case but rather overturned a lower court ruling by 
addressing the antitrust treatment of vertical restraints in general.53 
 
C. Contributory Inducement 
 
One area of the law where the concept of an indirect action, a 
solicitation if you will, can constitute a violation is well developed is 
under patent law, and particularly contributory infringement. 
Infringement may be either direct or indirect:54  
 
“(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the 
United States, or imports into the United States any patented invention 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.  
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as 
an infringer.  
                                                 
50 Id. at 1117 (emphasis added). 
51 In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1983).  
See United States v. Robles, 185 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Cal 1960) (A solicitation by 
letter was held to be an attempt to unlawfully import a narcotic); See also United 
States v. May, 625 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1980) (Defendant through a telephone call 
to someone in control of certain relevant records engaged in a course of conduct 
designed to culminate in the unlawful concealment of government records). 
52 United States v. Yellow Cab. Co., 332 US 218, 227 (1947). 
53 Id. at 220. 
54 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)-(c)(LEXIS through 2015). 
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(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports 
into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 
combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in 
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the 
invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted 
for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall 
be liable as a contributory infringer.”  
 
Section 271(a) is considered to refer to direct infringement while 
(b) and (c) are indirect, contributory or induced infringement (although 
the Patent Act does not use the terms direct and indirect).  Section 271(c) 
applies to the sale of a component of a patented product and hence is not 
relevant to the sale and use of flat rate manuals.  However 271(b) 
concerns the active inducement of infringement – a range of actions to 
cause, encourage or aid others in the infringement of a patent.   
The case law concludes infringement must have taken place 
before the owner can act.  An ancillary issue is if the evidence can be 
purely circumstantial.  The case law is mixed on the latter issue and 
hence abundant.  The intent here is to provide only the flavor of the 
decisions as the purpose of the review is not to probe patent law 
specifically, but rather to establish that the law broadly recognizes both 
inducement and the use of circumstantial evidence to establish a 
violation.  Subsequently, we will examine the application of inducement 
and circumstantial evidence regarding price fixing.  
The case law is consistent in recognizing that the conduct being 
induced must constitute direct infringement.  A leading case is National 
Presto Industries, Inc. v. West Bend Co.,55 which involved a patent for a 
device for cutting vegetables into spiral curls.  The appeal involved 
multiple issues of patent validity and infringement of which the 
inducement to infringe component is the only one of relevance here.  The 
facts are as follows: Presto sold its product commercially beginning in 
April 1991, and, based on trade rumors of West Bend’s efforts to 
produce a similar product, Presto’s chairman informed West Bend’s 
president of its patent application, whereupon West Bend is said to have 
increased its production efforts, placing its own slicer on the market in 
September of that year.  Presto sued West Bend for infringement on 
February 18, 1992, the day its parent issued.56   
                                                 
55 76 F.3d 1185, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
56 Id. at 1194. 
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Presto averred that its damages should include West Bend’s 
slicers placed on the market “during a reasonable period before Presto’s 
patent issued” on the interpretation of § 271(b) that “infringement by 
West Bend’s customers was directly, foreseeably, and intentionally 
caused by West Bend’s activities.”57   West Bend acted knowingly in 
Presto’s judgment having been previously informed of the allowed 
claims of Presto’s patent.58  The question before the appeals court then 
was whether § 271(b) permits a remedy for products put into commerce 
prior to the patent’s issuance.  The answer was no: “§ 271(b) does not 
reach actions taken before issuance of the adverse patent.”59   
 
The principle of liability for “aiding and abetting” 
the wrongful acts of others is not imposed 
retrospectively, to make illegal an act that was not 
illegal when it was done. That is, if the thing that 
was abetted was not illegal at the time of abetment, 
but depended on some future event that might not 
occur (such as issuance of the patent) liability cannot 
be retroactively imposed.60 
 
If this ruling is not sufficiently conclusive, there is Norberg 
Manufacturing, Co. v. Jackson Vibrators, Inc.,61 which applied to a 
patent for leveling railroad tracks.  The district court determined, “At the 
onset, plaintiffs must show a direct infringement of the patent . . . Since 
subsections (b) and (c) spring from the same basic doctrine, it is 
necessary to include the direct infringement requirement in (b).  
Furthermore, there is no basis in history or authority for a different rule 
under (b).”62  That is, there is no infringement violation nor are damages 
owing unless/until direct infringement occurs. 
But does contributory infringement apply only to willful acts, or 
can it occur innocently or unknowingly?  For direct infringement, the 
answer is that ignorance or lack of intent is no protection.63  “Under [35 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1195. 
59 Id. at 1196. 
60 Id. 
61 153 USPQ 777 (N.D. Ill. 1967). 
62 Id. at 783. 
63 Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968) (“It 
is, of course, elementary, that an infringement may be entirely inadvertent and 
unintentional and without knowledge of a patent.”).  See also Hilton Davis 
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U.S.C.S. § 271(b)], a plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged 
infringer's actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should 
have known his actions would induce actual infringements.”64  Willful 
acts may affect the recovery of damages, but the violation stands.  For 
contributory infringement the interpretation varies for Section 271(b) and 
(c) as § 271(c) refers specifically to “knowing the same”.65  For § 271(b) 
though “proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the 
infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement.”66  
“[M]erely permitting that [other] party to commit infringing acts does not 
constitute infringement, and it likewise cannot constitute ‘facilitating 
infringing acts.’”67  And, “[I]nducement requires evidence of culpable 
conduct, directed to encouraging another's infringement, not merely that 
the inducer had knowledge of the direct infringer's activities.”68 
What evidence then is required to establish infringement?  
Certainly direct evidence will suffice, but what of circumstantial?  An 
extreme example of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence occurred 
in Lucent Technologies v. Gateway, Inc.,69 which involved a dispute over 
an online calendar.  The method patent claimed a means of inserting 
information into the program without using the keyboard.  Because of the 
method nature of the allegedly infringed claims, infringement could 
occur only when the software was actually used.  The defendant argued 
in his/her defense that no evidence was offered of any customer except 
the plaintiff’s experts actually using the calendar program, which would 
have reduced the liability to indirect infringement only.  The expert 
though was evidently able to convince the court that he and his wife were 
not the only two people in the world that ever used the feature in 
question.  More generally, “Direct evidence of a fact is not necessary. 
Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more 
certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.”70 
                                                                                                             
Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkins Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
(“Accidental or ‘innocent’ infringement is still infringement.”). 
64 Lucent Technologies v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
65 35 U.S.C. 271(c) (2010). 
66 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
67 Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co. Ltd., 248 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
68 Lucent Technologies supra note 68, at 1322 quoting DSU Med., 471 F.3d 
1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1318. 
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So what have we learned from this excursion into patent law?  Patent 
case law recognizes that inducement of customers into illegal acts is 
possible, but for patents actual infringement must occur, the inducement 
must be an affirmative act, and the inducer must act knowingly.  The 
evidence of the infringement may however be circumstantial.  Beyond 
the recognition of the possibility of inducing one’s customers into illegal 
acts, relevant to the damage model proposed here,71 these other 
requirements set a high bar of proof for depicting the promotion of the 
use of flat rate manuals as a form of price fixing.  Another aspect of the 
law is required.  We explore next if section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act suffices. 
 
D. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
 
Under the Federal Trade Commission Act section 5, “Unfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared 
unlawful.”72  Congress at the time of the adoption of the Act in 1914 
attempted but failed to define specifically which practices were 
potentially harmful to competition.  The developing list was simply far 
too long to incorporate in the Act while by definition excluding future 
ones yet to be implemented by the business community.  The choice then 
was to leave to the Commission decisions on which business practices to 
bar.73  FTC actions do differ in that they are generally civil acts 
administered through administrative proceedings before the Commission 
rather than through the courts.74   
The two components of section 5, unfair methods of competition and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are subject 
to separate treatment by the FTC, so we here likewise evaluate them 
separately, beginning with unfair methods of competition.75 
 
                                                 
71 Damage Model, supra Section II. 
72 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 41(a)(1) (LEXIS through 
2015). 
73 See Report of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, S. Rep. No. 597, 
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914); see also Report of the Conference Committee, 
H.R. Rep. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914). 
74 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F. 2d 1086 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992) (discussing the Commission’s investigatory powers). 
75 See generally PETER C. WARD, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: LAW, 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Chp. 5 (L. J. Press 2005) (providing a detailed 
review of the historical development of the policies). 
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i. Unfair Methods of competition 
 
 In general, the ‘unfair methods of competition’ aspects of section 
5 have been interpreted to be coterminous with the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts76 such as price fixing.77  There exists though a component of these 
powers which exceeds the scope granted by the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts.  That interpretation was made particularly clear in Chuck’s Feed & 
Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co.   
 
An anticompetitive practice need not violate the 
Sherman Antitrust Act or the Clayton Act in order to 
violate the F[ederal] T[rade] C[ommission] Act . . 
.The power of the Federal Trade Commission to 
declare anticompetitive trade practices ‘unfair’ 
extends primarily to ‘trade practices which conflict 
with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts even though such practices may not actually 
violate those laws . . .The Federal Trade Commission 
itself looks to antitrust principles in deciding whether 
§ 5 of the FTC Act has been violated.78 
 
Moreover the Department of Justice, jointly with the FTC, issued 
in 1995 the interpretation that “[p]ursuant to its authority over unfair 
methods of competition, the Commission may take administrative action 
against conduct that violates the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, as 
well as anticompetitive practices that do not fall within the scope of the 
Sherman Act or Clayton Act.”79  Indeed, the Court’s interpretation of the 
powers of the FTC in section 5 go back to Federal Trade Commission v. 
Brown Shoe, “The Federal Trade Commission has power under § 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act to arrest trade restraints in their 
incipiency without proof that they amount to an outright violation of § 3 
of the Clayton Act or other provisions of the antitrust laws” particularly 
“with regard to trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of 
                                                 
76 Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (LEXIS through 2015); Clayton 
Antitrust Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (LEXIS through 2015). 
77 See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 418 (1990). 
78 Chuck’s Feed & Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289, 1293 (4th Cir. 
1987) (citations omitted). 
79 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FTC: ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES 
FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, Sec. 2.3 (1995), available at 
https://perma.cc/AN9R-UMRB. 
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the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not 
actually violate these laws.”80 
 Further, the broader applicability of section 5 had been endorsed 
back in 1953 by the Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. 
Motion Picture Advertising Service Co. “The ‘unfair methods of 
competition’, which are condemned by § 5(a) of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, are not confined to those that were illegal at common 
law or that were condemned by the Sherman Act. Congress advisedly left 
the concept flexible to be defined with particularity by the myriad of 
cases from the field of business.”81   
The courts though have the final word by means of the option for 
defendants to appeal FTC decisions as protection against the abuse of 
power by the Commission.82  Often that authority is used to limit the 
scope of FTC actions regarding the Commission’s definitions of what 
constitutes ‘unfair methods’.  That role is particularly evident in E.I. du 
Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, a case involving 
the pricing of a lead-based antiknock agent to gasoline.83  In its 
administrative hearing, the FTC had found the two largest suppliers of 
the compound followed  business practices that “unfairly facilitated the 
maintenance of substantial, uniform price levels and the reduction or 
elimination of price competition in the lead-based antiknock market,"84  
despite the fact that the adoption of the practices at issue were non-
collusive and independently served legitimate business practices.85  
The challenged practices were:  
 
(1) the sale of the product by all four firms at a 
delivered price which included transportation costs, 
(2) the giving by Du Pont and Ethyl of extra advance 
notice of price increases, over and above the 30 days 
provided by contract, and (3) the use by Du Pont and 
Ethyl (and infrequently by PPG) of a ‘most favored 
nation’ clause under which the seller promised that no 
customer would be charged a higher price than other 
customers.86 
                                                 
80 384 U.S. 316, 321-22 (1966) (footnote omitted). 
81 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953). 
82 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233, 246 (1972). 
83 729 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1984). 
84 Id. at 133. 
85 Id. at 130. 
86 Id. 
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At the time at issue, 1974-79, Du Pont and Ethyl had a combined 
72 percent market share with PPG and Nalco making up the remainder; 
PPG subsequently exited the industry prior to the FTC’s ruling.87   
Not only was the industry highly concentrated (and had always 
been so), it was in decline due to new environmental legislation severely 
restricting and eventually ending the use of lead in antiknock additives.  
Moreover, the product demand was shown to be highly inelastic and 
constituted a small part of the final price of gasoline.88  This combination 
of factors discouraged entry while encouraging price increases resulting 
in a product of above average profitability.89  Discounting when it 
occurred was initiated by Nalco and responded to by the majors through 
the offering of additional services like consulting and programming 
assistance rather than price reductions, that is, through various forms of 
non-price competition.90 
The FTC’s order prohibited “advance notice of price increases, 
uniform delivered prices, use of ‘most favored nation’ clauses by Du 
Pont and Ethyl, and limiting announcements of price increases to the 
press and others.”91  The order was premised on the interpretation of 
section 5 that “it can be violated even in the absence of agreement if the 
firms engage in interdependent conduct that, because of the market 
structure and conditions, facilitates price coordination in a way that 
substantially lessens competition in the industry.”92  As an OECD paper 
on the subject recognized, markets generally perform better “when 
participants convey relevant information” such as prices, product 
attributes, and the like.  However, such unilateral revealing of 
information may cause competitive harm, especially when related to 
future plans.93   
The complaint did not claim that the practices were the result of 
any agreement, express or tacit, among the manufacturers or that the 
practices had been undertaken for other than legitimate business 
purposes. “Each acted independently and unilaterally. There is no 
                                                 
87 Id. at 130, 135. 
88 Id. at 132. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 133-34. 
91 Id.at 134. 
92 Id. at 135. 
93 Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Unilateral Disclosure of 
Information with Anticompetitive Effects, at 11, DAF/COMP(2012)17 (Oct. 11, 
2012) available at https://perma.cc/R56L-PHXA. 
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evidence of coercive or predatory conduct.”94  The FTC simply alleged 
that the practices "individually and in combination had the effect of 
reducing uncertainty about competitors' prices of lead-based antiknock 
compounds," and that such reduced uncertainty "unfairly facilitated the 
maintenance of substantial, uniform price levels and the reduction or 
elimination of price competition in the lead-based antiknock market."95  
The appeals court faulted the FTC for not recognizing the legitimate 
business reasons for the impugned actions and more generally for not 
establishing “standards” for determining when independent and 
unilateral actions “become unlawful.”96  “Thus, even if the Commission 
has authority under § 5 to forbid legitimate, non-collusive business 
practices which substantially lessen competition, there has not been a 
sufficient showing of lessening of competition in the instant case to 
permit the exercise of that power.”97  The FTC order was set aside.98   
 
ii. Unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
 
The ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ prohibitions were added in 
1938 by the Wheeler-Lea Act99 and are often referred to as the consumer 
protection clause.  As explained in the House Report on the amendment 
summarizing congressional thinking, "This amendment makes the 
consumer, who may be injured by an unfair trade practice, of equal 
concern, before the law, with the merchant or manufacturer injured by 
the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor."100  It was however not 
until 1964 that the FTC articulated the factors to be considered, which 
were later referenced by the Supreme Court in Federal Trade 
Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson101 as,  
 
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having 
been previously considered unlawful, offends public 
policy as it has been established by statutes, the 
                                                 
94 E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 1984). 
95 Id. at 133. 
96 Id. at 140. 
97 Id. at 142 (citation omitted). 
98 Id. at 130. 
99 Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (current version at 15 
U.S.C. § 52 (2015) 
100 American Financial Serv. Assoc. v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 967-68 (1937) 
(quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3). See also S. Rep. No. 
1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1936). 
101 Sperry & Hutchinson, supra note 82, at 244. 
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common law, or otherwise -- whether, in other words, 
it is within at least the penumbra of some common-
law, statutory, or other established concept of 
unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, 
oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes 
substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or 
other businessmen).102   
 
Because of the cigarette advertising and Sperry & Hutchinson 
connections, these principals are often referred to as the Cigarette Rule or 
S&H Rule. 
Within a decade, the FTC had established explicit policies on the 
concepts of ‘unfairness’ and ‘deception’ as applied to consumer 
transactions.  The standards, as well as the violations, are distinct and 
independent.103  First released in 1980 was a “Policy Statement on 
Unfairness.”104  Making reference to the S&H Rule, the policy identifies 
three criterion: 
 
 The injury must be substantial. 
 
Injury usually involves monetary harm, but can also include the 
purchase of unwanted goods or services, defective ones, or unwarranted 
health or safety risks. 
 
 The injury must not be outweighed by any offsetting consumer 
or competitive benefits. 
 
Included are considerations of the costs a remedy would entail, along 
with the burdens to society in general of a regulation.   
 
 The injury must be one which consumers could not reasonably 
have avoided.   
 
                                                 
102 Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the 
Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964) (Statement of 
Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408). 
103 See Federal Trade Commission Act, Section 5 Unfair or Deceptive Acts or 
Practices, in FDIC COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL VII-1.1 (2015), 
available at https://perma.cc/XKY4-KH8L.   
104 FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, FTC, (Dec. 17, 1980). Appended to a 
letter to Senators Ford and Danforth, Consumer Subcommittee. 
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While it is generally assumed that consumers are able to make their 
own private purchase decisions without regulatory intervention, certain 
types of sales techniques may prevent customers from effectively making 
their own choices.105 
Policies regarding deception were released in 1983.106  Three 
elements underlying all deception cases were identified as:  
 
 There must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely 
to mislead the consumer. 
 
Misleading or deceptive practices have been found to include false 
oral or written representations, misleading price claims, sales of 
hazardous or systematically defective products or services without 
adequate disclosures, failure to disclose information regarding pyramid 
sales, use of bait and switch techniques, failure to perform promised 
services, and failure to meet warranty obligations. 
 
 The practice is assessed from the perspective of a consumer 
acting reasonably under the circumstances, or a group 
perspective if the practice is focused on particular groups. 
 The representation, omission, or practice must be a "material" 
one. 
 
Materiality applies when the act or practice is likely to affect the 
consumer's conduct or decision with regard to a product or service.107 
The Congressional response to these policy statements did not come until 
1994, with the enactment of 15 U.S.C. § 45(n):  
 
The Commission shall have no authority under this 
section or section 57a of this title to declare unlawful 
an act or practice on the grounds that such act or 
practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is 
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which 
is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves 
and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or to competition. In determining whether 
                                                 
105 Id. at 3. 
106 FTC Policy Statement on Deception, FTC, (October 15, 1983), 
https://perma.cc/2LWB-G2AD (statement incorporated in a letter to 
Representative Dingell, Chairman for the Committee on Energy and commerce). 
107 Id. at Summary. 
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an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may 
consider established public policies as evidence to be 
considered with all other evidence. Such public policy 
considerations may not serve as a primary basis for 
such determination. 
 
With this amendment, Congress removed the option of the Commission 
to use public policy as a primary basis for determining unfairness. 
 
E. Section Conclusions 
 
 Multiple laws and their interpretations by the courts recognize 
that numerous options exist for inducing illegal acts by other parties.  
Those laws though generally require some explicit act before action can 
be taken.  Sherman § 1 requires proof of a combination or conspiracy, an 
actual meeting of the minds, although the evidence may be 
circumstantial.  Sherman § 2 mandates an explicit solicitation had been 
issued while contributory infringement under the Patent Act requires any 
legal action be withheld until actual infringement has occurred.  The 
requirement of a documented explicit act or agreement means these acts 
do not apply to the damage model developed here for the use and 
promotion of flat rate manuals, which does not allege any coordinated 
actions.108  These acts do however recognize (a) unilateral solicitation 
can constitute a violation under some conditions, and (b) restraints may 
be vertical as well as horizontal. 
The broad exception to the requirement of concerted action is found in 
section 5 of the FTC Act, which has allowed ‘cease and desist’ orders 
even in instances when the inducement has been offered with no 
evidence it was accepted and acted upon.  As unilateral solicitation, an 
independent and unilateral action, is a key component of the flat rate 
damage model proposed here, it is relevant to explore the scope of legal 
interpretations under section 5.  This is done in Section IV following.  At 
the same time it is essential to determine if the alleged actions actually 
lessen competition, that is, if they are unfair or deceptive, to consumers.  
That issue is explored in Section V. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
108 See supra Part II. 
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IV. SIGNALING UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT 
 
The unsolicited and unilateral provision of an inducement to a 
potentially illegal act is referred to here as ‘signaling’. Three forms of 
signaling are considered: 
 
 Private,  
 Private and public, and  
 Public. 
 
We examine the case law for each in turn, recognizing that private 
communications are the most common, and considered the most 
insidious. Our real interest though relates to public solicitation as that is 
the form conjectured to be used by the producers of flat rate manuals. 
 
A. Private Communication 
  
Quality Trailer Products Corp. produced a variety of axel products.  In 
1990, two of its representatives met with an officer of a competitor, 
noting the competitor’s “prices for certain axel products were too low, 
that there was plenty of room in the industry for both firms, and that 
there was no need for the two companies to compete on price. They also 
provided assurances to the competitor that Quality Trailer Products 
would not sell certain axel products below a specified price.”109 The 
Commission concluded that, “The invitation, if accepted, would have 
constituted an agreement in restraint of trade,” a violation of section 5 of 
the FTC Act.110 The cease and desist order specified a cessation of 
communications “requesting, suggesting, urging, or advocating that any 
other producer or seller of axel products raise, fix or stabilize prices or 
price levels, cease providing discounts, or engage in any other pricing 
action.”111  
YKK manufactured and distributed zippers and related products, 
including leasing equipment for installing zippers. It with Tallon, Inc. 
accounted for approximately 82 percent of all zippers manufactured 
and/or sold in the US.  On July 1, 1988 a YKK attorney sent a letter to 
Tallon accusing Tallon of “unfair and predatory sales” and requesting 
Tallon take “immediate action to cease offering free equipment to 
customers and to withdraw outstanding offers of free equipment to 
                                                 
109 Quality Trailer Prods. Corp., 115 F.T.C. 944, 945 (1992). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 947. 
25
Lesser: Are Flat Rate Repair Time Manual Publishers Inviting Collusion?
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2016
450 Journal of Business & Securities Law [Vol. 16 
 
customers . . .” Subsequently at an October 21, 1988 meeting the YKK 
attorney asked an attorney for Tallon to “urge Tallon to desist from 
offering free instillation equipment.”112   
The Commission in its Complaint characterized the offering of 
free instillation equipment as “a form of discounting” such that an 
agreement between Talon and YKK would have constituted an 
unreasonable restraint of competition.”113 The cease and desist order 
included a prohibition from seeking an end to “providing free equipment 
or other discounts, cease providing any services or products, or engage in 
any other pricing action.”114 
 Precision Molding Co. manufactured and distributed wooden 
‘stretcher’ bars for mounting painting canvases as the dominant national 
supplier.115 Early in 1995 a new competitor was identified, which was 
offering Precisions’ customers a similar product at prices below 
Precision’s, according to documents provided by those customers.116 
During that period Precision delayed a planned price increase, and on 
June 23, 1995, Precision’s president met with an officer of its competitor 
at its place of business.117 At the meeting the president of Precision was 
quoted as calling the competitor’s prices “ridiculously low” and that he, 
the competitor, did not “have to give the product away.”118 Those 
statements were interpreted by the competitor as “an invitation to fix 
prices” at which point the competitor warned that price fixing was 
illegal119. Shortly thereafter Precision’s president threatened the 
competitor with a “price war” that it would be unable to survive.120 
Precision’s planned price increase was delayed throughout 1995 while 
attempting to ascertain if the competitor would remain a threat.121 The 
decision122 specified terms similar to those in Quality.123 
 
 
 
                                                 
112 YKK (USA) Inc., 116 F.T.C. 628, 629 (1993). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 631. 
115 Precision Moulding Co., 1996 FTC LEXIS 386, at *7 (1996). 
116 Id. at *2 
117 Id. at *3 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at *4. 
122 Id.at *7-10. 
123 Quality, supra note 109. 
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B. Public/Private Communication 
 
Stone Container Corp. manufactured liner board for forming 
corrugated boxes, the largest such manufacturer in the U.S.  Contrary to 
the Executives’ predictions, a January 1993 attempt to raise prices failed 
because of excessive inventory in the industry.  The Executives devised a 
“strategy to effect a coordinated price increase” consisting of (a) idling 
plants to reduce inventory, (b) reducing the company’s production, and 
(c) purchasing 100,000 tons from competitors.124 
Senior Stone officials contacted competitor counterparts to inform 
them of the proposed strategy and implementation plans. Those steps 
were followed during the second half of 1993 and communicated to 
competitors, both privately and through public statements, like press 
releases and published interviews, Stone’s belief that those “actions 
would support a price increase.”125  The Commission concluded that 
these communications “constitute[ed] an invitation by Stone Container to 
its competitors to join a coordinated price increase.”126 
U-Haul is the largest truck leasing company in the U.S. which with 
its major competitor, Budget, has a 70 percent market share for domestic 
one-way truck rentals.  The third national firm in the industry is 
Penske.127 
Through 2006, U-Haul Chairman Shoen was aware that competition 
from Budget was forcing his firm to lower its rates for one-way rentals.  
A two-component strategy was developed to secure higher rates: regional 
managers raise rates, contact Budget managers and inform them of the 
change and encourage Budget to follow – under the threat that otherwise 
U-Haul rates would be reduced to the original lower level.128  If Budget’s 
regional managers decided not to follow a price increase, then U-Haul 
one-way rates should be lowered below Budget’s, and Budget managers 
were to be informed of the rate reduction.  “In this way, U-Haul would 
teach Budget that its low-price policy was fated to be ineffective.” 
“EITHER WAY, LET THEM KNOW”129  
Shoen also instructed U-Haul dealers to communicate directly with 
Budget’s dealers.  A memo from Shoen to Budget’s dealers specified, 
                                                 
124 Stone Container Corp., 125 F.T.C. 853, 854 (1998). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 U-Haul Int’l Inc., 150 F.T.C. 1, 26 (2010). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). 
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“[w]hen you and your [regional managers] decide it is time to bring some 
One-Way rates back up above a money loosing [sic] 35 cents a mile, 
have your dealers let the Budget and Penske dealers know.”130  In 
October 2006, Robert Magyar, U-Haul regional manager for the Tampa 
Florida area, contacted a Budget representative and communicated the U-
Haul price increase. Implicit in the conversation was the threat that if 
Budget did not raise its rates U-Haul would lower its price to the original 
level.  The following October, Magyar repeated the call.  “I encouraged 
them to monitor my rates and to move their rates up.  And they did.”131 
Then on February 7, 2008 Shoen held an earnings conference call 
“aware that Budget representatives would monitor the call.” In the call 
Shoen stated: 
 
 “[H]ey, don’t throw money away.  Price at cost at least.”132 
 U-Haul will tolerate a small price differential, but only a small 
one: 3-5%. 
 “[I]f it [competitor’s lower price] starts to affect share I’m going 
to respond, that’s all.”133 
 
The administrative judge interpreted those communications, 
including the public ones conducted via the earnings call, as an attempt 
to raise and stabilize prices.  The FTC order was to cease and desist from 
such activities.134 
 
C. Public Communication 
 
Valassis Communications produced coupon booklets which were 
distributed through newspapers.  Over decades it maintained a fifty-fifty 
market share with News America Marketing.135  In June 2001, Valassis 
increased prices five percent, but News America did not join so in 
February 2002 Valassis rolled back the increase, leading to a price war 
with prices falling by [twenty] percent over 2001-04.136 
On July 22, 2004 Valassis used an earning conference call to 
communicate with News America representatives a willingness to cease 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 4. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 5. 
134 Id. at 23. 
135 Valassis Commc’n, Inc., 141 F.T.C. 247, 248-49 (2006). 
136 Id. at 249. 
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competition for customers.  “Valassis executives were aware that News 
America representatives would be monitoring the call.” At the initiation 
of the call Valasis CEO Alan Schultz laid out the new strategy: 
 
 Valassis would abandon 50 percent share goal and accept current 
share in mid-40s. 
 “[W]e will defend our customers and market share and use 
whatever pricing is necessary to protect our share.” 
 For customers with expiring contracts with News America, 
Valassis would bid at prices substantially above current levels, 
i.e., those prevailing in 2001.137  
 “If News America competes for Valassis customers, then the 
price war will resume.”138 
 
The FTC, concluding that Valassis acted with an intent to facilitate 
collusion and without a legitimate business purpose, issued an order 
banning communicating publicly or privately that it was ready to forbear 
from competition; to allocate or divide market share; or to raise, fix, 
maintain or stabilize prices.139 As important for our assessment here the 
decision included a comment on the use of public communications, “The 
Commission has concluded that the fact of public communication should 
not, without more, constitute a defense to an invitation to collude, 
particularly where market conditions suggest that collusion, if attempted, 
likely would be successful (here, a duopoly).”140  Private negotiation may 
be “the most efficient route.”  “But it is clear that anticompetitive 
coordination also can be arranged through public signals and public 
communications, including speeches, press releases, trade association 
meetings and the like.”141  
A similar relevant interpretation of business behavior was laid out in 
the DuPont case.   
 
The term ‘unfair’ is an elusive concept, often dependent 
upon the eye of the beholder. A line must therefore be 
drawn between conduct that is anticompetitive and 
legitimate conduct that has an impact on competition. 
Lessening of competition is not the substantial 
                                                 
137 Id. at 250. 
138 Id. at 251. 
139 Id. at 251, 275. 
140 Id. at 283. 
141 Id. at 284. 
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equivalent of ‘unfair methods’ of competition. Section 5 
is aimed at conduct, not at the result of such conduct, 
even though the latter is usually a relevant factor in 
determining whether the challenged conduct is ‘unfair.’ 
Nor does the statute obligate a business to engage in 
competition; if that were the case, many acceptable 
pricing and market decisions would be barred.142  
‘When a business practice is challenged by the 
Commission, even though, as here, it does not violate the 
antitrust or other laws and is not collusive, coercive, 
predatory or exclusionary in character, standards for 
determining whether it is ‘unfair’ within the meaning of 
§ 5 must be formulated to discriminate between 
normally acceptable business behavior and conduct that 
is unreasonable or unacceptable.’143   
In our view, before business conduct in an oligopolistic 
industry may be labelled "unfair" within the meaning of 
§5 a minimum standard demands that, absent a tacit 
agreement, at least some indicia of oppressiveness must 
exist such as (1) evidence of anticompetitive intent or 
purpose on the part of the producer charged, or (2) the 
absence of an independent legitimate business reason for 
its conduct.144  
 
D. Section Conclusions 
 
The preceding case review makes it clear that the FTC does indeed 
recognize that an inducement to conspire absent evidence of agreement 
can be a violation of section 5, and further that the inducement may be 
private, public, or both. What constitutes a violation - the line “between 
conduct that is anticompetitive and legitimate conduct that has an impact 
on competition” - is most clearly detailed in Du Pont: 
 
 “Section 5 is aimed at conduct, not the result of such conduct”, 
 “[S]ome indicia of oppressiveness must exist such as (1) 
evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose on the part of the 
                                                 
142 Du Pont, supra note 83, at 137-38, footnote excluded. 
143 Id. at 138. 
144 Id. at 139. 
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producer charged, or (2) the absence of an independent 
legitimate business reason for its conduct.”145  
 
As well the Commission will look for the ‘plus factors’ of oligopoly 
of market concentration and a low elasticity of demand which identify 
the potential to exercise market power.146  Clearly the auto flat rate 
manual sector exhibits these plus conditions.147  However, all the FTC 
cases apply to horizontal price fixing while the relationship between flat 
rate manual producers and repair shop owners is vertical in nature and 
there exists no indication of a conspiracy among the multitudinous repair 
shops.  Moreover, even if the sale price of flat rate manuals were 
somehow elevated, customers of the repair shops as indirect purchasers 
would be barred from recovering any damages under Illinois Brick v. 
Illinois.148 
Having established that unilateral signaling is actionable under 
section 5 we may conclude as well that unfair methods of competition as 
interpreted do not apply to the type of behavior exhibited by flat rate 
manual producers. We must then turn from the ‘unfair methods of 
competition’ to the ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ components of 
section 5 to determine if the alleged actions of flat rate manual producers 
is indeed a violation. That is done in Section V following. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
145 Id. at 138-39. 
146 Todd, supra note 37, at 198, 208. 
147 See supra Section II. 
148 Ill Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 724-25 (“[T]his Court rejected as a matter of law 
this defense that indirect rather than direct purchasers were the parties injured by 
the antitrust violation. The Court held that except in certain limited 
circumstances, a direct purchaser suing for treble damages under § 4 of the 
Clayton Act . . . is injured within the meaning of § 4 by the full amount of the 
overcharge paid by it and that the antitrust defendant is not permitted to 
introduce evidence that indirect purchasers were in fact injured by the illegal 
overcharge.”). 
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V. ARE FLAT RATE MANUAL PRODUCERS VIOLATING SECTION 5 
OF THE FTC ACT, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT? 
 
A. Are There Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices in the Use of 
Flat Rate Repair Manuals? 
 
When examining the consumer protection components of Section 5 
there is a choice between ‘unfair’ and ‘deceptive’ practices. As a 
reminder, the FTC policies for the two, respectively, are:149 
 
 The injury must be substantial, 
 The injury must not be outweighed by any offsetting consumer 
or competitive benefits, and 
 The injury must be one which consumers could not reasonably 
have avoided   
And 
 There must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely 
to mislead the consumer, 
 The practice is assessed from the perspective of a consumer 
acting reasonably in the circumstances, or a group perspective if 
the practice is focused on particular groups, and 
 The representation, omission, or practice must be a "material" 
one. 
 
To begin in the reverse order, deceptive practices are typically 
associated with the offering of products or services, including through 
advertising.150  Other examples include:  
 
Making misleading cost or price claims; using bait-
and-switch techniques; offering to provide a product 
or service that is not available; omitting material 
limitations or conditions from an offer; selling a 
product unfit for the purpose for which it is sold; and 
failing to provide promised services.151   
 
                                                 
149 See supra Section III.D.b 
150 See Ward, supra note 75, at 5-12 - 5-16 (providing case examples). 
151 Federal Trade Commission Act, Section 5 Unfair or Deceptive Acts or 
Practices, in FDIC COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL VII-1.1, VII-1.3 
(2015), available at https://perma.cc/XKY4-KH8L.   
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The promotion of flat rate manuals does not fit into any of these 
deceptive practices nor does their use by repair shops involve any direct 
deception of consumers. Indeed, shops typically post when flat rate hours 
are used for estimates. Thus, we turn our attention to unfair practices as 
they might be applied to the use of flat rate manuals from the perspective 
of repair customers. 
 
 The injury must be substantial. 
 
Injury is typically financial, although personal harm is also 
included.152 The 1980 estimate by the N.Y. Attorney General’s Office of 
$ 73 million annually for N.Y. motorists indicates substantiality.153 The 
1980 figure updated to current dollars and allocated over the national 
population yields an overcharge value of $ 3.5 billion, very notable 
indeed.154 
 
 The injury must not be outweighed by any offsetting consumer 
or competitive benefits. 
 
Presumably auto repair consumers benefit indirectly from any 
enhanced efficiency in shop management enabled by manual use. More 
particularly, customers do benefit from having a fixed repair cost 
estimate which shields them to a degree from unexpected additional costs 
should the repair take longer than anticipated. That is, with a fixed cost 
estimate based on the flat rate manual time requirement quote, the shop 
not the customer takes on the risk of an excessive repair time 
requirement. That is a consumer benefit.  The issue however is the net 
benefit; “the consumer injury must not be outweighed by any 
countervailing benefit to consumers”.155 In the Harvester case, the costs 
for an effective warning system were approximated at $ 2.8 million, but 
“expenses were not large in relation to the injuries that could have been 
avoided.”156   
                                                 
152 See FTC Policy Statement, supra note 104. See also Int’l Harvester Co., 104 
F.T.C. 949 (1980) (where ‘fuel geysering’ caused serious burns to at least 12 
individuals and one death was found to be injurious to users). 
153 See supra Part I. 
154 New York’s 19 million residents are about 6% of the national 2014 
population of 319 million. 
155 Harvester, supra note 152. 
156 Id. 
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It is difficult absent further information to estimate the benefit to 
auto repair consumers of any enhancement in shop management as well 
as to consumers for avoiding some of the risk of a more extensive repair 
time than anticipated. However, the rough cost estimate of $3.5 billion 
does suggest there is a likely net consumer cost overall, even if in some 
cases costs will be higher than expected. As regards competition, the 
concept of the damage model157 is that the flat rate manuals are being 
used to reduce competition among repair shops so there is little reason to 
anticipate a countervailing benefit through greater competition. Of 
course it would be possible to produce and market flat rate manuals with 
correct true average time estimates that could provide the same 
management benefits to shop owners and guaranteed repair cost 
estimates to consumers without the inflation of repair hour estimates 
which creates the alleged unfair practices. 
 
   The injury must be one which consumers could not reasonably 
have avoided.   
 
“Because consumers should be able to survey the available 
alternatives, choose those that are most desirable, and avoid those that 
are inadequate or unsatisfactory, the question of [avoiding injury] is 
whether an act or practice unreasonably impairs the consumer’s’ ability 
to make an informed decision.”158  Such an impairment can be created by 
a lack of alternatives in the market – i.e., where most market participants 
engage in a practice, consumers may have no meaningful way to avoid it. 
An alternative perspective applying to Harvester is, “Since fuel 
geysering was a risk that they were not aware of, [tractor users] could not 
reasonably avoid it.”159 
The use of auto repair flat rate manuals is prevalent so it makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, for consumers to identify non-manual using 
shops. Moreover, consumers are not aware that times are potentially 
inflated, and so have no incentive to search for those shops which do not 
use the manuals. We can then reasonably conclude that the use of flat 
rate manuals is unfair to consumers provided that the hours are 
overestimates of true, average time requirements.   
 
                                                 
157 Damage Model, supra Section II. 
158 Federal Trade Commission Act, Section 5 Unfair or Deceptive Acts or 
Practices, in FDIC COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL VII-1.1, VII-1.2 
(2015), available at https://perma.cc/3DB2-TTDB.   
159 Harvester, supra note 152, at 92. 
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B. Proposed Remedies 
 
From the preceding it can be reasonably concluded that flat rate 
manuals, which use overestimates of repair time requirements, are unfair 
for consumers under section 5 of the FTC Act. The unfairness is based 
on the potentially excessive repair time estimates, not on the concept of 
manuals per se as they have potential benefits for repair customers and 
shop operators. The excessive hours are allegedly generated by the 
manual producers who signal their existence to shop owners through 
public media, with the excess charges being paid by the repair customers.  
Section 5 case history recognizes both signaling and unfair practices as 
potential violations although the signaling case file focuses on horizontal 
rather than vertical signaling, the issue with flat rate manuals. 
If as proposed a complaint is brought under Section 5, the typical 
FTC administrative judgment involves a cease and desist order for 
specified conduct.160 In the context here that would apply to ad language 
suggesting using manual times allows repair shops to charge for more 
hours for the same work. That is, manual producers would likely be 
prohibited from using terminology like “beating the averages” and 
“charging the right price to the customers (instead of giving it away)”.161 
In the current context that restriction, though beneficial, would likely be 
inadequate.  That is because a major part of a Section 5 violation under 
my damage model involves the reporting of inflated or otherwise 
inaccurate repair times, in short being unfair. To resolve fully the 
overcharge issue the FTC must investigate the repair estimates per se. 
The courts lack the knowledge to judge the published numbers 
themselves, but can examine the methodology by which the repair time 
data are generated and on that basis determine if the process is adequate 
to provide representative values. For example, if the manual producers 
conduct time studies for individual repair times then the methodology 
would seem appropriate. If however, they simply extend the time 
estimates of auto manufacturers by one and a half 162 then in the absence 
of supporting documentation that approach would seem deficient. If the 
values represent true average repair times, then there is no violation; if 
not, then the publishers should be mandated to identify and apply an 
improved methodology. 
                                                 
160 See supra Section IV. 
161 See supra Section II. 
162 Id. 
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There is precedent for the government to be involved in reporting 
methodologies.  In particular, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act163, 
extended by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act164 (Dodd-Frank Act), requires the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to evaluate credit rating agencies and 
control some internal record-keeping processes. While the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act specifically prohibits the SEC from regulating the 
rating methodologies, the Dodd-Frank Act does require the Commission 
to develop regulations regarding the performance statistics of the rating 
agencies as well as the disclosure of the rating methodologies.165  What is 
proposed here is a similar treatment by the FTC of the methodologies 
used by flat rate manual producers.   
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act gives the 
Commissioners a broader authority than under the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts. In particular, that authority allows for unilateral private and public 
administrative action, which damage competition and consumers. 
The issue addressed here relates to the independent producers of flat 
rate repair time manuals with particular attention to manuals for the auto 
repair sector. Those producers are alleged here to be inflating the time 
requirements of repairs, leading to repair cost overcharges, which are 
unfair consumer practices under Section 5. Overcharges are possible in 
the repair sector under the damage model because of a low elasticity of 
demand for repair services, while widespread use of the same manual 
time means that the range of cost estimates will be reduced, which 
discourages consumers from searching further for lower costs. 
Consumers cannot reasonably avoid the costs associated with inflated 
flat rate hours. 
This scenario applies only if the repair times are indeed 
overestimated, either intentionally or through the use of an inadequate 
data collection methodology.  A remedy under Section 5 then must 
exceed the standard FTC ‘cease and desist’ order applying to the public 
communication and include a mandate that the independent manual 
                                                 
163 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 109–291, 120 Stat. 1327 
(2006). 
164 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).   
165Credit Rating Agencies, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,  
https://perma.cc/GC2R-HHAU. 
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producers document the data collection methodology used for scrutiny 
by FTC researchers. This process would represent an additional 
extension of the use of the enhanced FTC authority under Section 5 as 
the unilateral solicitation is vertical rather than the horizontal violations 
in the case history. However, “If the Commission is to attain the 
objectives Congress envisioned, it cannot be required to confine its road 
block to the narrow lane the transgressor has traveled; it must be allowed 
effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal, so that its order may 
not be by-passed with impunity.”166 After all, “those caught violating the 
Act must expect some fencing in.”167  Reporting true repair time 
estimates, if it should come to that, hardly seems a major ‘fencing in’ for 
flat rate manual producers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
166 FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952). 
167 FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 431 (1957). 
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